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ABSTRACT
Scholars have long discussed the locus of innovation and its determinants. There is
empirical evidence that innovations can be developed by those holding any of a number of
"functional" relationships to them such as manufacturer, user, or materials supplier. Past
studies have considered two factors important in predicting the functional locus of
innovation. One is "expected profit of a player involved in the innovation" and the other is
"stickiness of innovation-related information."
Although some studies have shown empirically the link between an innovator's
expected profits and the locus of innovation, no research has yet been conducted to test the
hypothesized relationship between stickiness of innovation-related information and locus of
innovation. In the study reported upon here, I explore relationships between these two
variables via a study of 24 innovations for the Japanese convenience-store industry. My
study shows empirically that stickiness of innovation-related information does have the
hypothesized relationship to the functional locus of innovation. I discuss implications of
these findings, and some directions for future research.
Key Words: Sticky Information, Problem Solving, Product Innovation, Convenience-
Store, Information Technology.
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1. Introduction and overview of this study
What factors should we consider in order to predict the locus of innovation?
Researchers studying innovation have attempted to answer these questions. Conventional
wisdom holds that innovation is carried out by manufacturers who perceive a need for new
products and then develop and market them. For example, many researchers have assumed
that the manufacturer is the innovator and have discussed the conditions under which
"incumbents" or "entrants" within the manufacturing sector innovate (Cooper and
Schendel, 1976: Gilbert and Newbery, 1982: Reinganum, 1983: Tushman and Anderson,
1986). However, von Hippel (1976, 1988) challenged this assumption by demonstrating
that the "functional" locus of innovation (manufacturers, users, or suppliers) varies among
industries and product categories. Beginning with his work, a group of past innovation
studies has particularly emphasized the role of the user in the innovation process (e.g.
Leonard-Barton, 1995; Lee, 1996; Shaw, 1985, 1986). They take the view that the user
generates the idea for a new product and initiates various stages of the development of the
product (Lee, 1996).
To date, two variables have been considered important for predicting the functional
locus of innovation. One is an "expected profit" of the players involved in innovation (von
Hippel, 1988). The other is "stickiness of innovation-related information" (von Hippel,
1994). The "expected profit hypothesis" maintains that, of the players involved, the player
who expects the highest profit from the innovation is most likely to innovate. On the other
hand, the sticky information hypothesis contends that the player who has the stickiest
innovation-related information is most likely to innovate. Before I proceed to my research
question, I will briefly explain the sticky information hypothesis that is the focus of this
paper.
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The sticky information hypothesis begins with the observation that information is
often costly to transfer from place to place. In 1994, von Hippel hypothesized that
information transfer costs would have an impact on the locus of innovation, and that
innovation-related problem-solving would tend to be carried out at the site of costly-to-
transfer information utilized by the problem-solvers. He also proposed a variable,
information "stickiness" that was focused strictly on the level of information transfer costs
independent of cause. (Information can be costly to transfer for any of a number of
reasons. Some have to do with the nature of information itself (e.g. tacitness of
knowledge: Polanyi 1958, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), some with the amount or
structure of the information that must be transferred (e.g. Rosenberg 1976,78), and some
with attributes of the seekers and providers of the information (e.g. absorptive capacity of
the seekers or/and the providers: Pavitt 1987,186; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).) He
defined stickiness of a given unit of information as the incremental expenditure required to
transfer that unit of information to a specific site in a form usable by a given information
seeker. When this cost is low, information stickiness is low; when it is high, stickiness of
information is high (von Hippel, 1994).
According to von Hippel (1995), product (or process or service) innovation
requires us to combine two or more types of information that may be located in physically
different places, and that may be sticky. For example, innovators require information on
user needs, a type of information which is initially located with the user who has generated
it. Innovators also need information on technological solution possibilities. This type of
information is often generated by and initially located at the site of product manufacturers.
It is necessary to transfer at least a certain amount of each type of information from one
place to another because successful product development requires a combination of the
two. In the case of product innovation, von Hippel's sticky information hypothesis would
suggest that, when information on technology is sticky and information on user needs is
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not sticky, the manufacturer is more likely to innovate because it is easier for the
manufacturer to understand the user needs than for the user to understand the technology to
satisfy the needs. Similarly, the hypothesis would suggest that when information on
technology is not sticky and information on user needs is sticky, the user is more likely to
innovate because it is easier for the user to understand the technology to satisfy the needs
than for the manufacturer to understand the user's needs.
No empirical research has been conducted to test the hypothesized relationship
between the stickiness of innovation-related information and the locus of innovation. In this
paper, I attempt to test this relationship. Therefore, my primary research question is: "
does the stickiness of innovation-related information in fact have a measurable impact on
the locus of problem solving in product innovation ?" In the next section, I describe my
research setting for this study (section 2). I then explain the methods and the hypotheses in
my empirical study of innovations for the Japanese convenience-store industry (section 3)
and report on my study findings (section 4). Finally, I elaborate on some of the patterns
found and offer suggestions for future research (section 5).
2. Research Setting
In the study I report on here, I empirically explore the relationship between sticky
information and the locus of innovation via a study of 24 innovations in store inventory
management systems developed by Seven-Eleven Japan (SEJ), the leading convenience-
store company (CVS) in Japan, and NEC, a leading manufacturer of computer hardware
and software in Japan. The goal of store inventory management is to accomplish
streamlined just-in-time inventory, which improves store efficiency by (1) removing "dead"
and slow-selling items; (2) replacing them with better-selling items; (3)providing forms to
assist in analysis of data such as dead items, ordering efficiency, and new product sales.
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The innovations related to store inventory management introduced into the CVS field by
SEJ have played a critical role in facilitating employees' order data-input, order data-
transfer, and data-analysis to accomplish streamlined just-in-time inventory1 . To try to
catch up with SEJ, its rivals have imitated these innovations. This fact shows the excellence
of innovations for SEJ's store inventory management.
My decision to focus on this particular category of innovations was dictated by four
practical considerations. First, I sought to combine my background in innovation research
with my previous research experience in the Japanese retailing industry. Second, several
books and journal articles on the Japanese CVS industry were available to understand the
history of the product innovation in this industry. Third, almost all the innovations in my
sample were developed by NEC for SE and both SEJ and NEC allowed me to obtain
information needed to test my hypotheses. This access was very valuable because, to
explore relationships between the stickiness of innovation-related information and the locus
of problem solving, it is necessary to collect data from both the user and the manufacturer.
Finally, the fact that the product innovations were developed relatively recently meant that
most of the important contributors to the innovations are still professionally active and
therefore able to provide me with rich, first-hand information on their activities.
Brief history of SEJ
A convenience-store is a retail store that supplies items to consumers, such as food
and beverages and household supplies, that are typically used within one hour of purchase.
SEJ is the leading firm in the Japanese CVS industry. SEJ ranks first among Japanese
retailers in terms of ordinary profit ($ 93.3 million in 1994) and third in terms of net sales
($ 13,923 million in 1994). SEJ operates Japan's largest CVS chain, consisting of almost
6,000 stores in 1994 (see Table 1).
1With regard to the list of the manufacturers for the ten largest CVS companies, see Table 1.
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Table 1. The ten largest CVS companies ranked by sales: their manufacturers in store
computer systems in 1994.
Rank CVS company Sales Number Manufacturer of Store
(User) ($ million) of Stores Computer
1. Seven-Eleven Japan 13,923 5,905 NEC
2. Lawson 8,214 5,139 NEC
3. Family Mart 4,863 2,749 TEC
4. Sun Shop Yamazaki 3,532 2,616 NEC
5. Circle K Japan 2,571 1,622 NEC (from 1995)
6. SunKus and Associates 1,859 1,093 NEC
7. Mini-stop 940 603 TEC
8. Kasumi Convenience Networks 897 721 Fujitsu
9. Kokubun 880 612 IBM
10. Seiko Mart 833 529 NEC
Source: Ryutsu Keizai no Tebiki 97 (Handbook of Distribution Economy 97, Nihon Keizai
Shinbunsya, 1996) and the author's own research.
SEJ's spectacular success in Japan can be attributed to its management information
system, which allows inventory to be turned over as many as 30 times a year, versus 12
times a year in the United States (Kotabe, 1995). To improve the efficiency of store
operations, SEJ has introduced and reformed its comprehensive store information system
four times. (1978-1981, 1982-1984, 1985-1990, 1990-now). Each system reform has
contributed to improvement of SEJ's store efficiency in terms of average stock turnover
time, average daily sales, and average gross profit margin.
Not only Japanese researchers but also some American researchers have recently
paid attention to the Japanese CVS, particularly SEJ in its efficiency (Kotabe, 1995;
Bernstein, 1996). In his case study of The Vanguard Program by SEJ to renovate the
Southland Corporation's Seven-Eleven store in USA, Kotabe (1995) pointed out that "the
next generation of Japanese competition may come unexpectedly from the service sector
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such as retail business." In this sense, SEJ's operation might be highly efficient on an
international level. In SEJ's operation, store inventory management has played a critical
role, and it is no exaggeration to say that SEJ's outstanding performance so far has
depended on product innovation developed for SEJ's store inventory management. Thus,
the product innovations developed for SET deserve to be examined, as the study of the
patterns of such innovation might provide us with a better understanding of "best practice"
with regard to locus of problem solving in product innovation. That is another reason that I
elected to focus my study on product innovation in store inventory management systems
within the Japanese CVS industry.
Overview of SEJ-NEC System Development Procedures
SEJ inventory management system development is the responsibility of the
Information Systems Development Group in SEJ. During the period covered by this
study, this Department has consisted of a staff of approximately 6 people, and has had a
single manager. No one in the Department has an engineering degree, or skills in hardware
or software development. (This is perhaps not surprising: the SEJ inventory management
system was an entirely paper-based one at the start of the events recorded in this study.
Systems using computer software and hardware were only introduced as a consequence of
the events we have documented in this study.) NEC is the traditional supplier of equipment
such as hand-held terminals to SEJ, and was the company customarily selected by SEJ to
develop any new systems and equipment that SEJ might need. The Department that SEJ
dealt with at NEC was the System Integration Department specializing in the development
of systems for retail and service industries. This Department was staffed by approximately
600 engineers specializing in computer hardware and software development. During most
of the period covered by this study, the SEJ projects at NEC were managed by the same
individual.
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To identify needs for changes in its inventory management systems, SEJ's
Information Systems Development Group periodically set up temporary task forces
specifically for this purpose. Four such task forces were set up during the period covered
by this study, each existing for a period of 2-3 months. The first such "task force"
consisted of the Department manager only. The succeeding task forces consisted of 4-6
people drawn from both the Department and from SEJ store personnel. Each task force was
entirely an internal SEJ matter: No one from NEC or other outside firms served on them.
At the conclusion of each task force, proposals for needed new inventory management
system hardware and software were written and passed to SEJ headquarters for approval.
After approval was received, the proposals were sent out to multiple vendors (such as
Fujitsu, NEC and IBM) for bid. A single vendor was then selected to build and supply the
improved system, and in all the cases studied here, the successful bidder was NEC.
After NEC had been selected as the successful vendor, SEJ and NEC personnel
would meet frequently as the development work progressed. At later stages of the project,
NEC would often provide partial system prototypes for testing by SEJ. Experience with
these would often result in progressive refinement of SEJ system specifications, in the
back-and-forth pattern that is characteristic of situations where design work depends on
information that is sticky at more than one site (von Hippel 1994). For example, SEJ
requested that a hand-held terminal to be designed by NEC be "light in weight." When
NEC provided a "light-weight" prototype, SEJ tested it and found that the prototype was in
fact much too heavy for store workers to hold for long periods of time, and told NEC that it
must be made much lighter.
3. Research Methods and Hypotheses
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Source of Information
The information used in this paper comes from several sources. Semistructured
interviews were conducted (both face to face and via telephone) with those who had
actually been involved in SET's system reform and /or had first-hand knowledge of the
development of the innovations in our sample. I also interviewed several of SEJ's
competitors in the convenience-store industry and those who were or are involved in
similar projects for SEJ's competitors. Most interviews lasted from one to three hours.
Additional information was collected from SEJ's and NEC's published literature. Follow-
up questions were discussed in additional face-to-face meetings, and by telephone, fax, and
electronic mail. All information from interviews that we report has been cross-checked with
two or more experts to ensure accuracy.
Identification of Innovations
Using the sources noted above, I identified a total of 24 innovations that met the
following three criteria:
(1) were embodied in software and/or hardware products provided by NEC to SEJ.
(2) were first commercialized prior to 1992 (when the last comprehensive information
system reform was completed) .
(3a) offered users improvement in an existing function relative to the previous best
practice
or
(3b) offered users a new function to enable them to accomplish streamlined just-in-time
inventory.
My sample of major innovations was identified via a two step process. First I
reviewed (1) SEJ's corporate history (written by SEJ); (2) other documents proposed by
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SEJ to NEC and also by NEC to SEJ; (3) published literature about SEJ and /or other
convenience-store companies. After that, I conducted exploratory interviews with 32
participants in the field, and generated a preliminary list of 24 innovations meeting my
criteria. Next, I asked experts from SEJ and NEC to review the list I had assembled, and to
suggest additions and deletions. The result of this procedure was the selection of 24 major
innovations that met my sample selection criteria (see Table 2).
Table 2. Innovation list: Year and Description of innovations developed by NEC for SEJ
store inventory management (1978-1992).
No. Year Description of the innovation
1. 1978 Easy input of ordering data with a bar-code and a pen-reader
2. 1978 Electronic data transfer through public line
3. 1978 Print-out of records of order entry
4. 1980 Size reduction of the hardware by 1/3
5. 1980 Easy switch from a phone mode to an electric data transfer mode
6. 1980 Fast print-out of records of entry data by 1/3
7. 1982 Electronization of the ordering book (EOB)
8. 1982 User-friendly design of the electric ordering book
9. 1982 Portability of the hardware
10. 1982 Aggregation of item-by-item data
11. 1982 Running 3 jobs simultaneously on the hardware (3 applications)
12. 1985 Making the actual sales data available on the EOB display
13. 1985 Increasing data processing capabilities of the hardware
14. 1985 Dust protection for the hardware
15. 1990 Making graphical data available on the display of the hardware for ordering
16. 1990 User-friendly design for data entry and data analysis
17. 1990 Checking punctual and precise delivery by vendors
18. 1990 Registration of the place where each item is organized on the shelf
19. 1990 Making delivery data available for demand prediction
20. 1990 User-friendly design of the hardware for delivery inspection and item-place registration
21. 1990 Running 8 jobs simultaneously in the hardware (8 applications)
22. 1990 Water protection for the hardware
23. 1990 Easy maintenance of the store computer
24. 1990 Automatic data transfer
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Hypotheses
As I mentioned above, the purpose of this study is to explore the relationships
between the stickiness of innovation-related information and the locus of problem solving
in the product innovation. To explore the relationships, I look at two aspects of problem
solving involved in development of product innovation. In general, product innovation can
comprise two types of design. One is need (functional) design and the other is technology
design. "Need design" is defined as design giving a new solution to the problem (user
need) which the user actually or potentially has. An example is "easier data input for order
entry." "Technology design" is defined as design giving a new technological solution to
meet a given user need. An example here is "developing the software program language
enabling the graphical data analysis on the liquid crystal display." In this sense, we can say
that players involved in product innovation solve these two design problems. Nevertheless,
technology management literature has paid attention to the technology design problem
rather than the need design problem. I think that the need design problem should not be
overlooked because we often see cases in which companies failed in finding promising user
needs to be met by their existing or newly developed technologies. Particularly, in IT
(information technology) -related innovations like those in this study, not only technology
design but also need design is very important because new technologies are often
developed as part of reform of the user's business process, which in turn leads to a new
configuration of user functions (needs). In this study, I thus make distinction between two
design problems (need design and technology design) involved in each innovation process,
and I treat these two separately.
Now, I propose my hypotheses for this study. Concerning the "stickiness of
innovation-related information," I have two hypotheses.
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H1. The stickier the user information is, the more of the need design is done
by the user.
H2. The stickier the technology information is, the less of the technology design
is done by the user.
Earlier, we noted that past innovation researchers have also considered another
factor to predict the locus of innovation: expected profit. However, SEJ and NEC have an
agreement that NEC cannot sell any innovations developed for SEJ's store inventory
management to competitors for a period of 2 years after first put into use by SEJ. This
agreement was tacit prior to 1985 and explicitly encoded in a contract after that date. This
contract is independent of the amount of problem-solving efforts invested by SEJ in a given
innovation. Accordingly, I do not expect to find a link between the amount of user
problem-solving and the user's ability to appropriate innovation-related benefit in the
sample studied here. In fact, the user might have an incentive to invest less in an
innovation, because he gets the same level of innovation protection regardless. In this
sense, I do not expect to find a link between the expected profit of the user and the amount
of problem solving done by the user. Similarly, I do not expect to find a link between the
expected profit of the manufacturer and the amount of the problem solving done by the
manufacturer because the agreement does not allow the manufacturer to get the profit
comparable to the amount of problem solving done by the manufacturer (the manufacturer
cannot sell the innovation to other users for 2 years).
Thus, I propose the following hypotheses with regard to the relationships between
"expected profit" and locus of problem solving involved in product innovation
development. Due to the special contractual relationship between the user and the
manufacturer in this case:
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H3. The amount of the user's expected benefit from using the innovation is not
correlated with the amount of the need design done by the user.
H4. The amount of the user's expected benefit from using the innovation is not
correlated with the amount of the technology design done by the user.
H5. The amount of the manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation
is not correlated with the amount of the need design done by user. 2
H6. The amount of the manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation
is not correlated with the amount of the technology design done by user.
Operationalization of variables used to test hypotheses
Here, I describe how I measure stickiness of innovation-related information, the
locus of innovation, and expectations of innovation-related profit.
Measurement of information stickiness
As was noted earlier, information stickiness can have many causes: the amount of
information that must be transferred; the way that information is encoded; and attributes of
the seekers and providers of the information. It is very difficult to measure any of these
variables directly, especially retrospectively. Therefore I have measured the stickiness of
need-related information via a proxy variable: the number of user "activities" affected by an
innovation that were not already previously known to the manufacturer. (See examples
given below for illustrations of what is meant by an activity. By "previously known," I
mean "the same activity was already delivered to SEJ by an equipment produced by
NEC.") Similarly, I measure stickiness of technology-related information in terms of the
number of component technologies to be incorporated in an innovation that were not
already previously known to the user. By "component technologies," I mean "technology
2In H5 and H6, I use the amount of problem solving done by the user instead of the amount of problem
solving done by the manufacturer because the amount of the problem solving done by the user is inversely
related to the amount of the same problem solving done by the manufacturer and, as I mention later, I only
collected information on the amount of problem solving done by the user in this study.
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(e.g. LCD display) that can be relatively independently developed as one part of the whole
product," (see additional examples given below.) and by " previously known," I mean
"previously used by SEJ in a store inventory management system."
These proxy measures are in essence measures of the novelty of key innovation-
related information to user and/or manufacturer. I argue that they are useful proxies for
information stickiness in the particular circumstances of this study for the following
reasons. First, the amount of novel information to be transferred in each innovation is
(crudely) measured in the proxies in terms of the number of user activities that were novel
to the manufacturer, and the number of manufacturer component technologies that were
novel to the user. Second, I assume that the encoding-related stickiness of information in
each activity is similar. Third, I also assume that information transmitters and receivers are
the same for all innovations in the sample, and therefore attributes of information
transmitter and receiver did not vary from case to case. All of these assumptions are
admittedly very crude fi but I think that the proxy is nonetheless acceptable because the
assumptions are conservative with respect to the hypothesis I am testing. That is, to the
extent that they are incorrect, they will tend to lessen any correlation that might exist
between the proxy for information stickiness and the locus of innovation.
Measuring Need Information Stickiness - Examples
Recall that I measure stickiness of need information that would be required by a
manufacturer-based problem solver to develop the innovation in question in terms
of the number of user "activities" affected by an innovation that were not already
previously known to the manufacturer.
Low stickiness (score is O) if the innovation does not affect any user's
activity that was not already previously known to the manufacturer.
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Sample innovation with low stickiness: Faster print-out speed of order entry
record. In the case of this innovation, need information has low stickiness
because the print out of order-entry record activity by the user was already
known to the manufacturer.
Medium stickiness (score is 1) if the innovation affects a single user activity
that was not already previously known to the manufacturer.
Sample innovation with medium stickiness: Easy input of ordering data with
a bar- code and a pen-reader. In the case of this innovation, need
information has medium stickiness because the data input activity (single
activity) of item names and their quantity was not done by the user before
using NEC equipment. (Before the innovation, the employee at the SEJ
shop had to hand-write the quantity of the item to be ordered.)
High stickiness (score is 2) if the innovation affects multiple user activities
that were not already previously known to the manufacturer.
Sample innovation with high stickiness: Graphical data display on the
electronic ordering book. In the case of this innovation, need information
has high stickiness because this innovation links three activities, that is,
order entry, graphical data analysis, and visual check of the inventory of the
store shelf by SEJ's shop stuff. The equipment previously used did not
enable SEJ to do these activities simultaneously. Before the innovation, the
employees at the SEJ shop had analyzed data such as slow-selling items,
ordering efficiency, and new product sales in the back office of the shop
and then they had ordered the item in the different place, that is, on the sales
floor. The innovation made it possible for them to analyze, on the sales
floor, such graphical data as had been analyzed in the back office, count
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the items on the shelf visually, and reorder if necessary and make decision
to cut an item if it is not selling well.
Measuring Technology Information Stickiness - Examples
Recall that I measure stickiness of technology information that must be transferred
to the user in order for the user to specify the technical means to implement the
innovation in terms of the number of "component technologies" affected by the
innovation that were not already previously known to the user.
Low stickiness (score is 0) if the innovation does not involve any
technology that was not already previously known to the user.
Sample innovation with low stickiness: Developing a better printer for the
existing order-terminal. In the case of this innovation, technology
information has low stickiness because SEJ previously used a printer for the
print-out of the entry data.
Medium stickiness (score is 1) if the innovation involves an improvement to
single component technology that was not already previously known to the
user.
Sample innovation with medium stickiness: Developing a novel software
programming language to control graphical chart on a liquid crystal display.
In the case of this innovation, technology information has medium
stickiness because SEJ did not previously use this software language, nor
did it previously do graphical data analysis on portable equipment.
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High stickiness (score is 2) if the innovation involves improvements to
multiple component technologies that were not already previously known to
the user.
Sample innovation with high stickiness: Employing a battery and a liquid
crystal display in order to make an order entry equipment that was portable
and could be held in one hand. In the case of this innovation, technology
information has the high stickiness because SEJ had never used component
technologies such as a battery and a liquid crystal display for portable order
entry equipment.
Measurement of "locus of problem solving" and "expected profit"
Here I show how I measure "locus of problem solving involved in product
innovation development" and "expected profit of a player involved in product innovation".
In the case of Japanese product development, it is often difficult to identify the
locus of problem solving by simply asking them "who was the designer ?", because both
the user and the manufacturer are generally involved in both user need design and
technology design process. Thus, I do not measure the locus of problem solving directly.
Instead, I measure the amount of problem solving done by the user with regard to "user
need design" and "technology design".
In my study, I collected information on (1) the amount of problem solving done by
the user with regard to need design to define the innovation (user's need specificity); (2) the
amount of problem solving done by the user with regard to technology design to define the
innovation (user's technology specificity); (3) the expected benefits by SEJ from using the
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innovation (user expected benefit); (4) the expected benefits by NEC from selling the
innovation (manufacturer expected profit) 3. Table 3 shows how I measure these.
Table 3. Description of how to measure "locus of problem solving" and "expected profit."
Variable S
Names
UNEEDSPC
(amount of
problem
solving done 1
by the user
with regard
to need
design)
core Description of Questions
To what extent did SEJ initiate need design to define the
innovation ?
Need - SEJ expressed a general need for the innovation, but does
not have any idea of how to accomplish the goal.
Example: improving productivity of each shop
2 Solution type - SEJ had enough information to be able to select
specific type of solution from a variety of possibilities. Knowledge
of the solution type would be derived from some understanding of
the specific attributes of all the types and which of those attributes
bear on the problem.
Example: reforming the inventory system to reduce the order entry
cost
3 Functional specification - SEJ had a good idea of what the
innovations had to do, but was not be able to specify the
performance in quantitative design terms.
Example: making order entry data easier
4 Design - SEJ was able to supply quantitative requirements for
most of the user-need-related features of the innovation. SEJ was
also be able to provide more detailed need function-related
suggestions as a result of prototyping the innovation or previous
experience.
Example: eight digit bar-code and a one lb bar-code reader.
3 To obtain the score of "manufacturer expected profit", I collected information on the expected profits by
NEC from selling the innovation for (i) SEJ, (ii) other convenience-store companies, and (iii) companies of
other retail type respectively and calculated the total score of (i), (ii), and (iii) (see Table 4). Although I also
used the highest score of the above three variables as "manufacturer expected profit," the results of my
analysis did not change.
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UTECSPC
(amount of
problem
solving done
by the user
with regard
to technology
design)
(continued)
To what the extent did SEJ initiate technology design to define the
innovation.
Not SEJ but NEC initiated all levels of technology design.1
2 SEJ told NEC to use a few specific technologies, but did not have
enough information to be able to select specific type of
technological solution from a variety of possibilities with regard to
such technologies.
Example: SEJ told NEC to use a liquid crystal display and a
battery to reduce the hardware weight.
3 SEJ told NEC to use a few specific technologies, and actually
selected specific type of technological solution from a variety of
possibilities with regard to such technologies.
Example: SEJ told NEC to use an STN liquid crystal display and
a lithium battery to reduce the hardware weight.
4 SEJ told NEC to use almost all specific technologies, and also
selected specific type of technological solution from a variety of
possibilities with regard to a few of the technologies.
Example: SEJ told NEC not only to use an STN liquid crystal
display and a lithium battery but also to use RAM,
mount technology, and so on to satisfy its needs.
5 SEJ told NEC to use almost all specific technologies, and actually
selected specific type of technological solution from a variety of
possibilities with regard to such technologies.
Example: SEJ told NEC to employ an STN liquid crystal display,
a lithium battery, static RAM, surface mount, and so
on to reduce the hardware weight.
6 SEJ supplied all required technology-related information including
quality control information.
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(continued)
USEPROF To what extent did SEJ expect a benefit from (developing)
(user's purchasing and using the innovation?
expected
benefits) 1 SEJ had thought that it would make a loss immediately from
purchasing and using the innovations.
2 SEJ had thought that it would neither make a loss nor benefit from
purchasing and using the innovation.
3 SEJ had thought that it would benefit somewhat from purchasing
and using the innovation.
4 SEJ had thought that it could greatly benefit from the purchasing
and using the innovation.
SEVEN To what extent did NEC expect to pr to SEJ?
(manufacturer's
expectedprofits The company might make a loss from developing and selling the
1) 1 innovation.
The project would be profitable, but the profit level might not be
2 acceptable.
Everyone expected the project to be acceptably profitable, but
3 nobody expected it to be very profitable.
Everyone expected the project to be very profitable.
4
CVS To what extent did NEC expect to profit from selling the same
(manufacturer's innovation to other CVSs, considering that NEC would
expectedprofits additionally invest in selling it to them ?
2)
1 The company might make a loss from selling the innovation.
2 The project would be profitable, but the profit level might not be
acceptable.
3 Everyone expected the project to be acceptably profitable, but
nobody expected it to be very profitable.
4 Everyone expected the project to be very profitable.
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OTHERS
(manufacturer's
expectedprofits
3)
(continued)
To what extent did NEC expect to profit from selling the same
innovations to users other than CVSs, for example super-stores
and specialty stores, considering that NEC would additionally
invest in selling it to them ?
1 The company might make a loss from selling the innovation.
2 The project would be profitable, but the profit level might not be
acceptable.
3 Everyone expected the project to be acceptably profitable, but
nobody expected it to be very profitable.
4 Everyone expected the project to be very profitable.
In terms of user's need specificity, user's technology specificity, and user expected
benefit, I sent the questionnaire shown in Table 3 to SEJ's CIO and asked him to rank
each innovation in my sample on a scale of 1-4, 1-6, and 1-4 respectively. He has been
involved in SEJ's information system development related to store inventory management
almost from its inception.
In terms of user's need specificity, user's technology specificity, and manufacturer
expected profit, I also sent the questionnaire shown in Table 3 to an expert at NEC and
asked him to rate each innovation in my sample on a scale of 1-4, 1-6, and 1-4
respectively. He had also been involved in the information system development for SEJ
from inception (he is not involved in the current project for SEJ). With regard to user's
need specificity and technology specificity, the respondents from SEJ and NEC answered
the same questionnaire separately. Interrater reliability was then assessed for user's need
specificity and user's technology specificity by calculating of Cronbach's alpha. The values
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were .9697 for the judgment of user's need specificity and .9025 for user's technology
specificity.4
4. Results
In this section, I attempt to test several hypotheses mentioned earlier. They are:
Hi. The stickier the user information is, the more of the need design is done
by the user.
H2. The stickier the technology information is, the less of the technology design
is be done by the user.
H3. The amount of the user's expected benefit from using the innovation is not
correlated with the amount of the need design done by the user.
H4. The amount of the user's expected benefit from using the innovation is not
correlated with the amount of the technology design done by the user.
H5. The amount of the manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation
is not correlated with the amount of the need design done by user.
H6. The amount of the manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation
is not correlated with the amount of the technology design done by user.
To test these hypotheses, I conducted correlation analysis. Table 4 shows the
variables analyzed in this study and their descriptive statistics. Table 5 shows Kendall's
tau-b correlation coefficients with their significance levels.
4In the later analysis, I use the scores obtained from the SEJ's respondent with regard to user's need
specificity and user's technology specificity, but the result did not change even when I used the scores
obtained from the NEC's respondent.
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Table 4. Description, means, and standard deviations (S.D.) of the variables analyzed in
this study (N = 24)
Variable Description Mean
Name S.D.
USEPROF user's expected benefit: the extent to which SEJ had 3.63
expected a benefit from (developing) purchasing and using .58
the innovation.
SEVEN manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation 2.25
to SEJ: the extent to which NEC had expected profits from .44
developing and selling the innovation to SEJ.
CVS manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation 2.83
to other CVS companies: the extent to which NEC had .76
expected profits from developing and selling the innovation
to other CVS companies.
OTHERS manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation 3.00
to companies of other retail types: the extent to which .88
NEC had expected profits from developing and selling the
innovation to companies of other retail types.
CVSOTHER manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation 5.83
to other companies than SEJ: the extent to which NEC had 1.61
expected profits from developing and selling the innovation
to other companies than SEJ; (the score of CVS) + ( the
score of OTHERS) for each innovation.
MPROF manufacturer's expected profit: the extent to which NEC 8.08
had expected profits from developing and selling the 1.72
innovation; (the score of SEJ) + (the score of CVS) + ( the
score of OTHERS) for each innovation.
UNEEDSPC user's need specificity: the amount of problem solving 3.42
done by the user with regard to user need design to define .83
the innovation.
UTECSPC user's technology specificity: the amount of problem 1.67
solving done by the user with regard to technology design .92
to define the innovation.
USESTICK stickiness of user need information: the expenditure 1.13
required to transfer the user need information to define the .85
innovation from the user-site to the manufacturer-site in a
usable form.
TECSTICK stickiness of manufacturer's technology information: the .79
expenditure required to transfer the technology information .98
to define the innovation from the manufacturer-site to the
user-site in a usable form.
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Table 5. Kendall's tau-b correlation coefficients between user's need specificity
(UNEEDSPC), user's technology specificity (UTECSPC), stickiness of
technology information (TECSTICK), stickiness of user need information
(USESTICK), manufacturer's expected profit (MPROF), and user's expected
benefit (USEPROF). (N= 24)
1. UNEEDSPC 2. UTECSPC 3. TECSTICK 4. USESTICK 5. MPROF
2. UTECSPC .1421
3. TECSTICK - .1711 -. 4789*
4. USESTICK .5784** -. 1007 .2145
5. MPROF -. 1449 -. 1677 -. 1170 -.3991*
6. USEPROF .1659 .1059 .0564 .3944* - .3170
** p<.01, * p <.05
According to Table 5, the results support my hypotheses with regard to
relationships between the "stickiness of innovation-related information" and the "amount of
problem solving done by the user." As Table 5 shows, I reject the null hypothesis that the
amount of stickiness of user need information (USESTICK) is not correlated with the
amount of problem solving done by the user with regard to user need design to define the
innovation (UNEEDSPC) (Kendall correlation coefficients = .5784, P< .01). This result
suggests that the stickier the user need information is, the more of the need design is done
by the user (H1).
I also reject another null hypothesis that the amount of stickiness of technology
information (TECSTICK) is not correlated with the amount of problem solving done by the
user with regard to technology design to define the innovation (UTECSPC) (Kendall
correlation coefficients = -. 4789, P < .05). This means that the stickier the information on
technology, the less of technology design is done by the user; consequently, more of the
technology design is done by the manufacturer (H2).
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The above two results also suggest that, when the user need information is sticky
and the technology information is also sticky, the need design is likely to be done by the
user and the technology design innovation is likely to be done by the manufacturer.
Although I rated information stickiness for each innovation on a scale of 0-2 in these
analyses, the results did not change even when I rated it on a scale of 0-1 (Score is 0 when
the innovation-related information has low stickiness; score is 1 when the innovation-
related information has high or medium stickiness).
With regard to relationships between "expected profit" and "amount of problem
solving done by the user," the results also support my hypotheses. According to Table 5, I
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the amount of user's expected benefit (USEPROF) is
not correlated with the amount of problem solving done by the user with regard to user
need design (UNEEDSPC) (H3) and with that of problem solving done by the user with
regard to technology design (UTECSPC) (H4). Also, I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the amount of manufacturer's expected profit (MPROF) is not correlated with the
extent of user's need specificity (UNEEDSPC) (H5) and with that of user's technology
specificity (UTECSPC) (H6). As I mentioned earlier, I do not expect to find a link between
the amount of user's problem solving (that is, user's need specificity and technology
specificity; these also reflect the amount of problem solving done by the manufacturer), the
user's expected benefit, and the manufacturer's expected profit because of the agreement
between NEC and SEJ on sales to other retailers. Thus, the results are what I
hypothesized.
Next, I look at other findings revealed in the correlation analysis. First, Table 5
shows that I reject the null hypothesis that the amount of stickiness of user need
information (USESTICK) is not correlated with the amount of manufacturer expected profit
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(MPROF) (Kendall correlation coefficients = -.3991, P < .05). This is reasonable because
the innovations with stickier user need information are more specific to SEJ, that is, they
are less likely to be expected to sell to other retail companies.
To check these relationships, I conducted correlation analysis with regard to
manufacturer's expected profit from selling to SEJ (SEVEN), to other CVS (CVS), to
companies of other retail types (OTHERS), and to both other CVSs and companies of other
retail types (CVSOTHER) and stickiness of user need information (USESTICK).
Table 6. Kendall's tau-b correlation coefficients between manufacture's expected profit
from selling to SEJ (SEVEN), other CVS (CVS), or companies of other retail
types (OTHERS), or both other CVSs and companies of other retail types
(CVSOTHER) and stickiness of user need information (USESTICK) (N=24)
1. SEVEN 2. CVS 3. OTHERS 4. CVSOTHER
2. CVS .0479
3. OTHERS .3734 .7481***
4. CVSOTHER .3488 .7920*** .9748***
5. USESTICK - .1820 -. 3040 -. 4116* -.3898*
*** p<.001, **p<.01, * p<.05
According to Table 6, the expected relationship is supported by the results. Table 6
shows that I reject the null hypotheses that stickiness of user need information
(USESTICK) is not correlated with the amount of manufacturer's expected profit from
selling the innovation to companies of other retail types (OTHERS) (Kendall correlation
coefficients = -. 4116, P < .05) and that stickiness of user need information (USESTICK)
is not correlated with the amount of manufacturer's expected profit from selling the
innovation to other retail companies than SET (CVSOTHER) (Kendall correlation
coefficients = -.3898, P < .05). These results suggest that when the user need information
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is sticky, the manufacturer's expected profit from selling the innovation to other users is
low.
Furthermore, I reject the null hypothesis that the amount of stickiness of user need
information (USESTIK) does not correlate with the user's expected profit (USEPROF)
(Kendall correlation coefficients = .3944, P < .05) (see Table 5). This result means that,
when the user need information is sticky, the user's expected profit from using the
innovation is high. This is also reasonable because innovations with stickier need
information could affect more user's activities to be streamlined and the reform of the
activities with the product innovation could thus make the user a profit. The summary of
the findings in this study is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Summary of the findings in this study
Stickiness of Technology
Information
(+)
/
Information
Manufacturer's
Expected Profit
(+)
User's
Expected Profit
+ = positive influence; - = negative influence
5. Discussion
Until now, no empirical research has been conducted to test the hypothesized
relationship between the stickiness of innovation-related information and the locus of
problem solving in product innovation. In this paper, I explored the hypothesized
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relationship via a study of 24 innovations developed for the Japanese convenience-store
industry. My findings provide empirical support to the hypothesis that the stickiness of
innovation-related information plays a critical role in predicting the locus of problem
solving. This empirical evidence is important, because as Ducharme (1989) pointed out,
another hypothesis with regard to locus of innovation, the "expected profit hypothesis,"
might not be practicable in sectors where rents do not serve as an incentive (for example, in
government laboratories). In this sense, "stickiness of innovation-related information"
could be another variable used in predicting the locus of innovation in such sectors.
This exploratory study has been focused on patterns in the locus of innovation for projects
carried out between a single user and a single manufacturer in a single industry. I have not
yet examined how generalizable my findings are. I suggest that it will be useful to carry
out more extensive studies on this topic in a range of industries for a number of reasons.
In addition to the information that they can provide on the relationship between sticky
information and the functional locus of innovation, such studies can contribute to our
understanding of the patterns of cooperation among users and producers during the
development process studied by authors such as Rothwell and Gardiner (1985) and Shaw
(1985). These authors have pointed out that, especially in the instance of complex and
specialized equipment (such as the SEJ inventory management systems we have studied),
there is a need for direct cooperation between user and producer during the process of
innovation. They also can also directly contribute to our understanding of how the signals
regarding innovation-related needs and potential solutions become more specific, resulting
in an increase in what Teubal (1976) calls "market determinateness." And, finally, when
studies on this topic are extended to cases where multiple users interact with one or more
producers, they can provide information bearing on theories of the nature of interactions
among multiple users and producers that have been developed by researchers such as
Lundvall (1988).
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